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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 In 1979, an accident occurred at a nuclear power 
facility near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, releasing radiation into 
the atmosphere and catapulting the name, "Three Mile Island," 
into the national consciousness.  Sixteen years later, we are 
called on once again to consider the Three Mile Island accident 
3 
as we determine the appropriate standard of care for the 
operators of the facility. 
 I.  Procedural History 
 The accident at the Three Mile Island ("TMI") nuclear 
power facility occurred on March 28, 1979.  As a result, 
thousands of area residents and businesses filed suit against the 
owners and operators of the facility,0 alleging various injuries.0  
This case involves the consolidated claims of more than 2000 
plaintiffs for personal injuries allegedly caused by exposure to 
radiation released during the TMI accident. 
 These cases began more than a decade ago, when 
plaintiffs filed damage actions in the Pennsylvania state courts 
and the Mississippi federal and state courts.0  After defendants 
removed the state cases to federal court, asserting federal 
jurisdiction under the Price-Anderson Act, we held that the Act 
created no federal cause of action and was not intended to confer 
jurisdiction on the federal courts.  See Kiick v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., 784 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Stibitz v. 
                     
0Defendants in this case were, at the time of the TMI accident, 
"the owners and operators of the nuclear facility, companies 
which had provided design, engineering or maintenance services, 
and those vendors of equipment or systems installed in the 
facility."  In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832, 836 
(3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 906 (1992). 
0Defendants have settled non-personal injury claims brought by 
individuals, businesses, and non-profit organizations within a 
twenty-file mile radius of the TMI facility.  See Stibitz v. 
General Pub. Util. Corp., 746 F.2d 993, 995 n.1 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(citing In Re Three Mile Island Litig., No. 79-0432 (M.D. Pa. 
Sept. 9, 1981)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985). 
0Counsel for plaintiffs concede they filed suit in Mississippi to 
take advantage of the state's six-year statute of limitations, 
instead of the two-year Pennsylvania statute. 
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General Pub. Utils. Corp., 746 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985).  The actions were remanded to the 
appropriate state courts. 
 Subsequently, Congress enacted the Price-Anderson 
Amendments Act of 1988 ("1988 Amendments" or "Amendments Act"), 
Pub. L. No. 100-408, 102 Stat. 1066, which expressly created a 
federal cause of action for "public liability actions"0 and 
provided that such suits arose under the Price-Anderson Act.  42 
U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (1988).  The Amendments Act also provided for 
consolidation of such actions, including those already filed, in 
one federal district court.  Id. § 2210(n)(2).  Accordingly, 
these personal injury actions were removed to federal court and 
consolidated in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  We upheld 
the constitutionality of the retroactive application of the 
federal jurisdiction provisions of the Amendments Act and 
remanded the actions back to the district court.  In re TMI 
Litig. Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1991) ("TMI II"), 
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 906 (1992).  
 Contending they had not breached the duty of care, 
defendants then moved for summary judgment, which the district 
court denied.  In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, No. 88-1452, 
slip op. at 36 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1994).  After holding that 
                     
0The Amendments Act defined a "public liability action" as "any 
suit asserting public liability."  42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (1988).  
"[P]ublic liability" was defined as "any legal liability arising 
out of or resulting from a nuclear incident or precautionary 
evacuation," except for certain claims covered by workers' 
compensation, incurred in wartime, or that involve the licensed 
property where the nuclear incident occurs.  Id. §2014(w).        
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federal law determines the standard of care and preempts state 
tort law, id. at 23, the district court found the standard of 
care was set by the federal regulations: 1) prescribing the 
maximum permissible levels of human exposure to radiation0 and 2) 
requiring radiation releases to be "as low as is reasonably 
achievable," which is known as the "ALARA" principle.0  Id. at 
28-29.  The court held that each plaintiff must prove individual 
exposure to radiation in order to establish causation, but not to 
establish a breach of the duty of care.  Id. at 30-31. 
 Upon defendants' motion, the district court certified 
for interlocutory appeal the duty of care and causation issues: 
1) Whether 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.105 and 20.106, and not 
ALARA, constitute the standard of care to be 
applied in these actions; 
 
2) Whether a particular Plaintiff's level of exposure 
to radiation or radioactive effluents relates 
solely to causation or also to the duty owed by 
Defendants. 
In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, No. 88-1452 (M.D. Pa. July 13, 
1994).0  We granted the petition for interlocutory appeal. 
                     
0See 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.105, 20.106 (1979).  For a discussion of 
these regulations, see infra part III.B.1. 
0
"ALARA" is defined to mean "as low as is reasonably achievable 
taking into account the state of technology, and the economics of 
improvements in relation to benefits to the public health and 
safety, and other societal and socioeconomic considerations, and 
in relation to the utilization of atomic energy in the public 
interest."  10 C.F.R. § 20.1(c).  The term appears in several 
sections of the C.F.R., including § 20.1(c), §50.34a, and § 
50.36a.  For a further discussion of the term, see infra part 
III.B. 
0The district court also certified a question regarding punitive 
damages, which we discuss in a separate opinion.  See In Re: TMI, 
cite.  We resolve other issues concerning the applicable statute 
of limitations in a third opinion.  See In Re: TMI, cite.  
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 The district court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 
§2210(n)(2) (1988).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§1292(b) (1988) and exercise plenary review over the legal 
questions certified.  See Buzzard v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 
966 F.2d 777, 779 (3d Cir. 1992). 
II.  Preemption 
 Initially, we must address the district court's 
decision that federal law determines the standard of care, 
preempting state tort law.  See In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. 
II, No. 88-1452, slip op. at 23 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1994).  The 
district court essentially relied on our holding in TMI II, 940 
F.2d 832, 859 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 906 (1992), 
and decisions following it.0  See In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. 
II, No. 88-1452, slip op. at 15-23 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1994).  But 
plaintiffs contend that TMI II did not resolve this issue.   
 Under the 1988 Amendments, the applicable law for 
"public liability actions" is "the law of the State in which the 
nuclear incident involved occurs, unless such law is 
inconsistent" with federal law.  42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (1988). 
Thus, Pennsylvania tort law would control here, unless 
inconsistent with federal law.  But TMI II decided this issue by 
preempting state tort law on the standard of care. 
                     
0See, e.g., O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 
1105 (7th Cir.) ("[W]e agree with the Third Circuit in TMI that 
it is clear . . .  that state regulation of nuclear safety, 
through either legislation or negligence actions, is preempted by 
federal law."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2711 (1994). 
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 In TMI II, we considered the constitutionality of the 
1988 Amendments, specifically, whether they improperly conferred 
"arising under" jurisdiction.  940 F.2d at 848-49.  Examining the 
Amendments Act's "federal components," we found federal 
preemption of state tort law on the applicable standard of care. 
See id. at 858 ("Two Supreme Court cases indicate that the duty 
the defendants owe the plaintiffs in tort is dictated by federal 
law."); id. at 859 ("Permitting the states to apply their own 
nuclear regulatory standards, in the form of the duty owed by 
nuclear defendants in tort, would, however, 'frustrate the 
objectives of federal law.'") (citation omitted); id. ("Under 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., states are preempted from imposing a 
non-federal duty in tort, because any state duty would infringe 
upon pervasive federal regulation in the field of nuclear safety, 
and thus would conflict with federal law.").  Thus, TMI II 
definitively resolved the issue whether federal law preempts 
state tort law on the standard of care. 
 But we also said, "Consequently the plaintiffs' rights 
will necessarily be determined, in part, by reference to federal 
law, namely the federal statutes and regulations governing the 
safety and operation of nuclear facilities."  Id. at 860. 
Plaintiffs contend that, by using the term "in part," "this Court 
left open the question of whether the applicable duty of care is 
exclusively federal."  Appellees' Br. at 37.  We cannot agree. 
Because we held that federal law preempted state law on the duty 
of care, plaintiffs' rights had to be determined, at least in 
part, by federal law.  We did not address whether federal law 
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also controlled other aspects of plaintiffs' claims, such as 
causation and damages, because they were not at issue.  TMI II 
controls, and federal law determines the standard of care and 
preempts state tort law.  See also O'Conner v. Commonwealth 
Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1105 (7th Cir.) (citing TMI II) 
(holding state law on the duty of care preempted in tort suits 
involving nuclear safety), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2711 (1994). 
III.  Statutory and Regulatory History 
 Although it is clear that federal law governs the 
standard of care for tort claims arising from nuclear accidents, 
it is more difficult to discern the precise contours of that 
federal duty.  The question appears to be one of first impression 
for a federal appellate court.0  Accordingly, we will examine the 
language of the relevant statutes and regulations, and the 
underlying history and policies. 
A.  Statutes  
 Nearly a half century ago, Congress initiated its 
regulation of nuclear power through the enactment of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755.  The Act 
was designed to establish an industry to generate inexpensive 
electrical power, transforming "atomic power into a source of 
energy" and turning "swords into plowshares."  Pacific Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 
461 U.S. 190, 193 (1983). 
                     
0Some federal district courts and state courts have considered 
this issue, with varying results.  See infra part IV.C.   
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 Although the 1946 Act designated the nuclear industry a 
government monopoly, Congress later decided to permit private 
sector involvement.  See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 
83-703, 68 Stat. 919.  The 1954 Act "grew out of Congress' 
determination that the national interest would be best served if 
the Government encouraged the private sector to become involved 
in the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes under a 
program of federal regulation and licensing."  Pacific Gas & 
Elec., 461 U.S. at 206-07 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 
2d Sess. 1-11 (1954)). 
 Nevertheless, because of the unique nature of this form 
of energy production, the fledgling nuclear industry faced many 
problems, particularly: 
the risk of potentially vast liability in the 
event of a nuclear accident of a sizable 
magnitude . . . . [W]hile repeatedly 
stressing that the risk of a major nuclear 
accident was extremely remote, spokesmen for 
the private sector informed Congress that 
they would be forced to withdraw from the 
field if their liability were not limited by 
appropriate legislation. 
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 
64 (1978) (citations omitted). 
 In response, Congress enacted the Price-Anderson Act 
"to protect the public and to encourage the development of the 
atomic energy industry."  Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 1, 71 Stat. 576 
(1957).  The Act limited the potential civil liability of nuclear 
plant operators and provided federal funds to help pay damages 
caused by nuclear accidents.  Id.  Congress has amended the 
Price-Anderson Act three times, most recently in 1988, 
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"provid[ing] a mechanism whereby the federal government can 
continue to encourage private sector participation in the 
beneficial uses of nuclear materials."  In re TMI Litig. Cases 
Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832, 853 (3d Cir. 1991) ("TMI II") (citing 
S. Rep. No. 218, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1476, 1479), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 906 (1992). 
 Throughout this period, Congress repeatedly sought to 
encourage the development of the nuclear power industry.  Yet, 
Congress has continued the "dual regulation of nuclear-powered 
electricity generation: the Federal Government maintains complete 
control of the safety and 'nuclear' aspects of energy generation; 
the States exercise their traditional authority over the need for 
additional generating capacity, the type of generating facilities 
to be licensed, land use, ratemaking, and the like."  Pacific Gas 
& Elec., 461 U.S. at 211-12 (footnote omitted). 
  B.  Regulations 
 Volume 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1979)0 
governs energy matters, and its first chapter regulates the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC").0  Parts 20 and 50 of 
Chapter 1 are the relevant sections. 
1.  10 C.F.R. Part 20 
                     
0In this case, the relevant federal regulations were those in 
place at the time of the TMI accident in 1979.  Unless otherwise 
noted, all citations to the Code of Federal Regulations refer to 
the 1979 version. 
0See infra note 20. 
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 Part 20 of 10 C.F.R. ch. 1 outlines "Standards for 
Protection Against Radiation."  Under the "General Provisions" of 
Part 20, § 20.1(c) provides a statement of the ALARA principle: 
 In accordance with recommendations of 
the Federal Radiation Council, approved by 
the President, persons engaged in activities 
under licenses issued by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission . . . should, in 
addition to complying with the requirements 
set forth in this part, make every reasonable 
effort to maintain radiation exposures, and 
releases of radioactive materials in 
effluents to unrestricted areas, as low as is 
reasonably achievable.  The term "as low as 
is reasonably achievable" means as low as is 
reasonably achievable taking into account the 
state of technology, and the economics of 
improvements in relation to benefits to the 
public health and safety, and other societal 
and socioeconomic considerations, and in 
relation to the utilization of atomic energy 
in the public interest. 
(emphasis added). 
 Immediately following the "General Provisions" of Part 
20 is a subpart covering "Permissible Doses, Levels, and 
Concentrations," which regulates exposures of radiation to 
persons on the property of a nuclear facility, see 10 C.F.R. 
§§20.101-.104,0 as well as those off premises, see id. § 20.105-
.106.  The latter regulations, governing "unrestricted areas,"0 
are relevant here because plaintiffs were outside the TMI 
premises when the alleged radiation exposures occurred. 
                     
0These regulations apply to persons in "restricted areas," which 
are defined as "any area access to which is controlled by the 
licensee for purposes of protection of individuals from exposure 
to radiation and radioactive materials."  10 C.F.R. §20.3(a)(14). 
0An "unrestricted area" is "any area access to which is not 
controlled by the licensee for purposes of protection of 
individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials, 
and any area used for residential quarters."  Id. § 20.1(a)(17). 
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 Section 20.105 sets the "[p]ermissible levels of 
radiation in unrestricted areas," i.e., outside the TMI 
facility's boundaries.  It mandates that the NRC approve license 
applications if the applicant shows its plan is not likely to 
cause anyone to receive radiation in excess of 0.5 rem0 per year.  
§ 20.105(a).  In subsection (b), the regulation provides that 
except as authorized by the NRC, no licensee shall cause 
"[r]adiation levels which, if an individual were continually 
present in the area, could result in his receiving a dose in 
excess of" two millirems in any hour or 100 millirems in any 
week.  The parties dispute whether the § 20.105 standard 
governing off-site exposure was violated during or after the TMI 
accident. 
 While § 20.105 defines the levels of radiation 
permitted in unrestricted areas, § 20.106 defines the levels of 
radioactivity permitted in liquid or airborne effluents released 
off premises.  It provides that licensees "shall not possess, 
use, or transfer licensed material so as to release to an 
unrestricted area radioactive material in concentrations which 
exceed the limits specified in Appendix 'B', Table II of this 
part, except as authorized . . . ."  Appendix B then lists more 
                     
0Doses of radiation of different ionizations are expressed in 
"rems," a unit of measurement that "embodies both the magnitude 
of the dose and its biological effectiveness."  U.S. Dep't of 
Commerce, Permissible Dose From External Sources of Ionizing 
Radiation: National Bureau of Standards Handbook 59 30-31 (1954); 
see also 10 C.F.R. § 20.4(c) (defining rem as "a measure of the 
dose of any ionizing radiation to body tissues in terms of its 
estimated biological effect relative to a dose of one roentgen 
(r) of X-rays"). 
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than 100 isotopes of almost 100 radioactive elements and provides 
the maximum permissible level of releases.  Defendants admit that 
the radiation levels at the boundary of the TMI facility exceeded 
the § 20.106 standards after the 1979 accident.0  Nevertheless, 
they claim that no plaintiff was in an area exposed to the 
impermissible levels. 
   2.  10 C.F.R. Part 50 
 In order to understand the ALARA concept and whether it 
forms part of the standard of care, it is necessary to examine 
Part 50 of 10 C.F.R. ch. 1, which covers the "Domestic Licensing 
of Production and Utilization Facilities."  Section 50.34a(a) 
requires that applications for construction permits include 
certain information about equipment design: 
 An application for a permit to construct 
a nuclear power reactors [sic] shall . . . 
also identify the design objectives, and the 
means to be employed, for keeping levels of 
radioactive material in effluents to 
unrestricted areas as low as is reasonably 
achievable.  The term "as low as is 
reasonably achievable" as used in this part 
means as low as is reasonably achievable 
taking into account the state of technology, 
and the economics of improvements in relation 
to benefits to the public health and safety 
                     
0See Appellants' Brf. at 6 ("[T]he concentrations of 
radioactivity at the site boundary exceeded the permissible 
levels set by 10 C.F.R. § 20.106 (1979)); id. at 33 
("[D]efendants would concede" that "the amount of radiation at 
the edge of Three Mile Island exceeded the federal permissible 
dose levels").  Nevertheless, defendants contend "that no excess 
releases reached any inhabited areas, much less those inhabited 
by Plaintiffs.  For example, Defendants' evidence indicates that 
the only regions where the effluents and the dose exceeded the 
federal levels were Three Mile Island itself, some of the 
Susquehanna River, and some other uninhabited islands in the 
river."  In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, No. 88-1452, slip op. 
at 34 n.10 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1994). 
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and other societal and socioeconomic 
considerations, and in relation to the 
utilization of atomic energy in the public 
interest.  The guides set out in Appendix I 
provide numerical guidance on design 
objectives for light-water-cooled nuclear 
power reactors to meet the requirements that 
radioactive material in effluents released to 
unrestricted areas be kept as low as is 
reasonably achievable.  These numerical 
guides for design objectives and limiting 
conditions for operation are not to be 
construed as radiation protection standards. 
 Section 50.36a lists technical specifications "to keep 
releases of radioactive materials to unrestricted areas during 
normal reactor operations, including expected operational 
occurrences, as low as is reasonably achievable."  § 50.36a(a). 
Subsection (b) provides in part: 
Experience with the design, construction and 
operation of nuclear power reactors indicates 
that compliance with the technical 
specifications described in this section will 
keep average annual releases of radioactive 
material in effluents at small percentages of 
the limits specified in § 20.106 of this 
chapter and in the operating license.  At the 
same time, the licensee is permitted the 
flexibility of operation, compatible with 
considerations of health and safety, to 
assure that the public is provided a 
dependable source of power even under unusual 
operating conditions which may temporarily 
result in releases higher than such small 
percentages, but still within the limits 
specified in § 20.106 of this chapter and the 
operating license.  It is expected that in 
using this operational flexibility under 
unusual operating conditions, the licensee 
will exert his best efforts to keep levels of 
radioactive material in effluents as low as 
practicable.  The guides set out in Appendix 
I provide numerical guidance on limiting 
conditions for light-water-cooled nuclear 
power reactors to meet the requirement that 
radioactive materials in effluents released 
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to unrestricted areas be kept as low as is 
reasonably achievable. 
 Appendix I to Part 50, referenced in §§ 50.34a and 
50.36a, then provides: 
numerical guides for design objectives and 
limiting conditions for operation to assist 
applicants for, and holders of, licenses for 
light-water-cooled nuclear power reactors in 
meeting the requirements of §§ 50.34a and 
50.36a that radioactive material in effluents 
released from those facilities to 
unrestricted areas be kept as low as is 
reasonably achievable.  Design objectives and 
limiting conditions for operation conforming 
to the guidelines of this Appendix shall be 
deemed a conclusive showing of compliance 
with the "as low as is reasonably achievable" 
requirements of 10 C.F.R. 50.34a and 50.36a. 
Design objectives and limiting conditions for 
operations differing from the guidelines may 
also be used, subject to a case-by-case 
showing of a sufficient basis for the 
findings of "as low as is reasonably 
achievable" required by §§ 50.34a and 50.36a. 
 The Part 50 Appendix I standards, governing permissible 
radiation releases, were set far below the levels permitted by 
§§20.105 and 20.106.  The parties apparently agree that a plant 
operator's compliance with the Appendix I guidelines will shield 
it from liability.  But they disagree on whether an operator's 
compliance with the higher emission levels permitted by §§ 20.105 
and 20.106 also suffices to protect it from liability. 
   IV.  Duty of Care 
 A fundamental disagreement in this case centers on 
which of the federal regulations, or combination thereof, sets 
the applicable standard of care for nuclear power defendants. 
Plaintiffs contend the ALARA regulations articulate the duty owed 
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by defendants, while defendants claim that 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.105 
and 20.106 govern.   
 The district court held that a "tri-level scheme," 
combining the ALARA regulations and 10 C.F.R. § 20.106, 
constituted the applicable standard of care.  In re TMI Litig. 
Cases Consol. II, No. 88-1452, slip op. at 28 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 
1994).  The court found that nuclear power defendants could not 
be held liable for radiation emissions below the minimum levels 
set by Appendix I of 10 C.F.R. part 50.  Id.  The court 
continued: 
[I]f Plaintiffs can prove that Defendants' 
emissions exceeded those levels set out in 
§20.106, Defendants will have violated the 
relevant standard of care and will be held 
liable, provided Plaintiffs are also able to 
satisfy the causation and harm elements of 
their claims.  If the evidence indicates that 
emissions levels fall between the two 
standards, Defendants may be held liable if 
Plaintiff can prove (along with the causation 
and harm prongs) that Defendants did not use 
their best efforts to reduce radioactive 
emissions. 
Id. at 29.  Both plaintiffs and defendants challenge this holding 
and, as we have noted, the district court certified whether 10 
C.F.R. §§ 20.105 and 20.106, and not ALARA, constitute the 
applicable standard of care. 
A.  Development of Radiation Protection Standards 
 We begin our analysis with a review of 10 C.F.R. 
§§20.105 and 20.106.  In 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission 
("AEC") issued regulations "to establish standards for the 
protection of [nuclear plant] licensees, their employees and the 
general public against radiation hazards."  25 Fed. Reg. 8595, 
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8595 (1960).  The dosage for persons in "unrestricted areas" (the 
public) was limited to ten percent of that permitted for persons 
in "restricted areas" (plant employees).  22 Fed. Reg. 548, 549 
(1957).  The preface to the regulation explained, "It is believed 
that the standards incorporated in these regulations provide, in 
accordance with present knowledge, a very substantial margin of 
safety for exposed individuals.  It is believed also that the 
standards are practical from the standpoint of licensees."  Id. 
 In 1960, the AEC substantially revised these 
regulations.  Upon recommendations from the Federal Radiation 
Council0 and the National Committee on Radiation Protection,0 the 
AEC promulgated §§ 20.105 and 20.106, setting 0.5 rem as the 
maximum yearly radiation exposure allowed for the general 
                     
0A 1959 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act created the Federal 
Radiation Council and ordered it to "consult qualified scientists 
and experts in radiation matters" in order "to advise the 
President with respect to radiation matters, directly or 
indirectly affecting health, including guidance for all Federal 
agencies in the formulation of radiation standards . . . ."  Pub. 
L. No. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688, 690 (1959).  Upon the establishment 
of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970, the functions of 
the council were transferred to the EPA, and it was abolished. 
See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 84 Stat. 2086, 2088-89 
(1970); 35 Fed. Reg. 15623, 15624, 15626 (1970). 
0The National Bureau of Standards sponsored the creation of the 
Advisory Committee on X-ray and Radium Protection in 1929. In 
1954, after the advent of atomic energy, the committee changed 
its name to the National Committee on Radiation Protection.  See 
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Permissible Dose From External Sources of 
Ionizing Radiation: National Bureau of Standards Handbook 59 iii 
(1954).  In 1964, Congress transformed the committee into the 
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements and 
charged it with developing information and recommendations 
concerning radiation protection.  Pub. L. No. 88-376, §§ 3, 16, 
78 Stat. 320, 321, 324 (1964) (codified at 36 U.S.C. §§ 4501-17 
(1988)). 
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public.0  25 Fed. Reg. 8595, 8595 (1960).  The AEC concluded the 
new regulations represented "an appropriate regulatory basis for 
protection of the health and safety of employees and the public 
without imposing undue burdens upon licensed users of radioactive 
material."  Id.  The AEC stated: 
 Recommended limits on exposure, based 
upon extensive scientific and technical 
investigation and upon years of experience 
with the practical problems of radiation 
protection, represent a consensus as to the 
measures generally desirable to provide 
appropriate degrees of safety in the 
situations to which these measures apply. 
While the numerical values for exposure 
limits established in this regulation provide 
a conservative standard of safety, the nature 
of the problem is such that lower exposure 
limits would be used if considered practical. 
At the same time, if there were sufficient 
reason, the use of considerably higher 
exposure limits in this regulation would not 
have been considered to result in excessive 
hazards. 
Id.  Four years later, in 1964, the AEC amended § 20.106 (and the 
Appendix B levels to which § 20.106 refers) to incorporate new 
recommendations made by the Federal Radiation Council to the 
President.  See 29 Fed. Reg. 14434, 14434 (1964); see also 28 
Fed. Reg. 10170, 10171 (1963).  The new limitations were designed 
                     
0In 1991, the NRC issued new regulations reducing the annual 
permissible exposure rate for the public to 0.1 rem per 
individual -- down from the 0.5 rem standard that had existed for 
more than three decades.  See 10 C.F.R. § 20.1301 (1995); 56 Fed. 
Reg. 23398 (1991).  The 1991 regulations adopted recommendations 
made by the International Commission on Radiological Protection 
in 1977.  See Leonard S. Greenberger, NRC Amends Radiation 
Protection Requirements, Pub. Util. Fortnightly, Jan. 15, 1991, 
at 54, 54.  Even with these reductions, the permissible exposure 
rate for the public in the United States remained higher than the 
.05 rem public exposure limit in Great Britain and the .03 rem 
limit in Germany.  See id.  
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"to protect individuals in the general population from exposure 
to radiation as a result of intake of radioactivity through air 
and water."  Id.   These regulations remained in effect at the 
time of the TMI accident in 1979.0  
B.  Development of ALARA 
 A decade after promulgation of §§ 20.105 and 20.106, 
the Atomic Energy Commission amended 10 C.F.R. parts 20 and 50 to 
incorporate an early version of the ALARA rule.  35 Fed. Reg. 
18385 (1970).  The AEC noted that a general purpose of its 
regulatory policy was to ensure "radiation exposures to the 
public should be kept as low as practicable."  Id. at 18386-87 
(promulgating §§ 20.1(c)).  The AEC then promulgated two sections 
in Part 50 to further this policy.  First, it added § 50.34a to 
ensure that applicants for nuclear license permits identified 
"the design objectives, and the means to be employed," for 
keeping levels of radioactive material in effluents as low as 
practicable.  Second, it enacted § 50.36a to require that 
licenses issued to nuclear operators include technical 
specifications to keep releases of radiation as low as 
practicable.  Id. at 18387-88. 
 In 1975, these regulations were modified in two ways. 
First, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the statutory successor 
to the Atomic Energy Commission,0 added Appendix I0 to define the 
                     
0The regulations have been significantly modified since 1979. See 
generally 10 C.F.R. chs. 20, 50 (1995). 
0The Atomic Energy Commission's regulatory functions were 
transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1974.  See 40 
Fed. Reg. 19439 (1975) (citing Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 
Pub. L. No. 93-438, § 201(f), 88 Stat. 1242-43).  
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"as low as practicable" admonition with numerical criteria. But 
in doing so the agency emphasized the criteria were not to be 
considered "radiation protection standards."  40 Fed. Reg. 19439, 
19439 (1975).  Second, the NRC replaced the term "as low as 
practicable" with "as low as reasonably achievable"; the former 
term was deemed "less precise" and already had been replaced by 
the International Commission on Radiological Protection 
("ICRP").0  Id. at 58847. 
C.  Case Law 
 In framing their arguments, both plaintiffs and 
defendants rely on decisional law, although we find the 
applicable case law inconclusive.  Plaintiffs, as well as the 
district court, cite Crawford v. National Lead Co., 784 F. Supp. 
439 (S.D. Ohio 1989).  In Crawford, neighbors of a uranium 
production plant sued over the plant's discharge of uranium into 
the atmosphere and a nearby river.  In denying defendants' motion 
for summary judgment, the district court found sufficient 
evidence of state law violations.  The court decided there was 
"no conflict between state tort law and the federal interests at 
issue here," because it found defendants had violated pertinent 
federal regulations, including ALARA.  Id. at 447.  Although the 
                                                                  
0For a description of Appendix I, see supra part III.B.2. 
0The ICRP is an "international radiation standards setting 
agency."  Robert K. Temple, Regulation of Nuclear Waste and 
Reactor Safety within the Commonwealth of Independent States: 
Toward a Workable Model, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1071, 1088 (1994). 
Formed in 1928 to "discuss and recommend safety standards for the 
use of radiation," its recommendations have become a primary 
basis for federal government regulation of the nuclear industry. 
A Guide to Toxic Torts (MB), § 36.03[5](b), at 36-55 (1995).     
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opinion cites favorably to the ALARA requirement, the court 
conducted a cursory review of the federal regulatory scheme and 
discussed the federal regulations only to demonstrate the absence 
of a conflict with state law.  
 For their part, defendants cite Akins v. Sacramento 
Municipal Utililty District, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1992), dismissed, 868 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1994), a suit alleging 
excessive discharges of radioactive materials from the Rancho 
Seco Nuclear Power Plant.  The court noted that Appendix I and 
the ALARA standard in § 50.36a(b) were not radiation protection 
standards, see id. at 794 n.7, and affirmed the grant of 
defendants' motion for summary judgment.  The court held that the 
evidence established that "no one, including any of the 
plaintiffs, was actually exposed to dosages of radiation which 
were more than a small fraction of the NRC and EPA standards." 
Id. at 814. 
 Defendants also cite several cases involving nuclear 
plant employees suing over alleged radiation exposures.  In these 
cases, courts routinely applied the parallel federal regulations 
governing persons in "restricted areas," see supra note 12, but 
did not apply ALARA.  For example, in O'Conner v. Commonwealth 
Edison Co., 748 F. Supp. 672 (C.D. Ill. 1990), aff'd, 13 F.3d 
1090, 1103-05 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2711 (1994), a 
nuclear plant worker filed suit against the operator of the 
plant, alleging injuries from radiation exposure.  After an 
analysis of the federal regulatory scheme, the district court 
held that the limits set in 10 C.F.R. § 20.101 (applicable to 
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workers on site, just as §§ 20.105 and 20.106 apply to persons 
off site) supplied the duty of care.  The court, without 
mentioning the ALARA regulations, stated: 
 These federal permissible dose limits 
are based upon the national and international 
scientific consensus as to the hypothetical 
risk from exposure to low occupational levels 
of ionizing radiation. . . . 
 
 In determining the likelihood of the 
injury from radiation, this Court believes 
that it should give deference to the 
administrative regulations which are the 
result of the agency's applied expertise. 
Id.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling 
that federal law preempts state tort law and that the a 
legislative enactment or an administrative regulation."  
Restatement (Seconcable standard of care.  O'Conner, 13 F.3d 1090 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2711 (1994). 
 Similarly, in Hennessy v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 764 
F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Ill. 1991), a nuclear plant worker received a 
routine medical exam and learned he had been contaminated with a 
radioactive material, but at a level below that permitted by 10 
C.F.R. § 20.103 (setting permissible levels for plant workers). 
Although he claimed no physical injury from the exposure, he sued 
under strict liability and for battery and negligent infliction 
of emotional distress.  The district court granted summary 
judgment to defendants, but stated in dicta that ALARA might have 
constituted part of the relevant standard of care.  Id. at 502.0 
                     
0For other cases in which courts have used the chapter 20 
permissible radiation levels as the standard of care in suits by 
nuclear plant employees, see Coley v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 
768 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (granting summary judgment to 
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 Although instructive, these cases do not resolve the 
precise issue here.  Nevertheless, we note that no court appears 
to have actually applied ALARA as part of the duty of care. 
                                                                  
defendant nuclear power plant because "the NRC regulations 
[specifically, § 20.102(b)] are determinative of the standard of 
care in occupational exposure cases"); Whiting v. Boston Edison 
Co., No. 88-2125 (D. Mass. Sept. 5, 1991) ("[T]he Federal 
Permissible Dose Standard constitutes the duty of care owed to 
the decedent in this case."); Jurka v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 
No. 88-C-7852 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 1990) (granting summary judgment 
against worker because plant did not exceed regulatory levels of 
exposure permitted by § 20.101(b)).  None of these cases 
discusses or applies ALARA.  But see Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee 
Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566, 580-83 (W.D. Okla. 1979) (holding state 
law not inconsistent with, and therefore not preempted by, 
federal radiation standards, including ALARA), aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part, 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 238 
(1984). 
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D.  Duty of Care 
 After reviewing the regulations, the reasons behind 
their promulgation, and the relevant case law, we hold that 
§§20.105 and 20.106 constitute the federal standard of care.0 
These regulations represent the considered judgment of the 
                     
0The Restatement (Second) of Torts expressly provides that, in 
certain situations, a "court may adopt as the standard of conduct 
of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment 
or an administrative regulation."  Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 286 (1965); see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton 
on the Law of Torts § 36, at 220 (5th ed. 1984) (citing numerous 
cases) ("When a statute provides that under certain circumstances 
particular acts shall be done or not done, it may be interpreted 
as fixing a standard for all members of the community, from which 
it is negligence to deviate.  The same may be true of . . . 
regulations of administrative bodies.").  We believe it 
appropriate to adopt §§ 20.105 and 20.106 as the standard of 
conduct in this situation.  As one commentator noted: 
 
 The element of breach of duty is a 
critical issue in the adjudication of 
radiation cases and one that presents 
significant problems.  The problems arise out 
of the necessity to create or adopt a legally 
sufficient standard by which to measure 
breach.  The answer to the problem in this 
highly regulated area should be 
straightforward: compliance or noncompliance 
with applicable government safety standards 
provides an excellent measure of breach. 
 
David S. Gooden, Radiation Injury and the Law, 1989 B.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1155, 1167-68 (1989); see also John C. Berghoff, Jr., NRC 
Regulations as a Standard for Legal Actions: Has the Public 
Shield Been Forged Into a Private Sword?, in Nuclear Litigation 
1984, at 57, 66 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook 
Series No. 272, 1984) ("It can be argued that the nuclear 
industry is appropriate for considering compliance to be 
conclusive proof of 'non-negligence' because Congress and the NRC 
have retained such close control over radiological hazards.  The 
nation's leading experts on radiation danger were involved in 
establishing the federal standards, and a reasonably prudent 
person should be able to rely on them as a standard of 
conduct.").  But see id. (offering alternative interpretations of 
the regulations). 
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relevant regulatory bodies -- the Federal Radiation Council, EPA, 
AEC, and NRC -- on the appropriate levels of radiation to which 
the general public may be exposed.0  See, e.g., 25 Fed. Reg. 
8595, 8595 (1960) (Sections 20.105 and 20.106 "provide an 
appropriate regulatory basis for protection of the health and 
safety of employees and the public without imposing undue burdens 
upon licensed users of radioactive material.").  In fact, the 
heading for this category of regulations is "Permissible Doses, 
Levels, and Concentrations," and the relevant regulations are 
phrased in terms of the maximum levels of radiation that may be 
released.  See 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.101-.108. 
 Although plaintiffs assert that § 20.105 applies 
exclusively to nuclear plant employees, we disagree.  Part 20 of 
10 C.F.R. ch. 1 is divided into separate sections governing 
permissible dose limits for individuals in "restricted areas," 
see §§ 20.101, 20.103, and "unrestricted areas," see §§ 20.105, 
20.106.  The definitions of "restricted" and "unrestricted 
areas"
0
 demonstrate that the C.F.R. sections governing persons in 
"unrestricted areas" were intended to cover persons outside a 
nuclear plant's boundaries, i.e., the general public.  The case 
law, while differing over the use of the ALARA standard, appears 
to have uniformly accepted this meaning.  See, e.g., Akins, 8 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794; Crawford, 784 F. Supp. at 447. 
                     
0As we have noted, these agencies have promulgated different 
standards regarding radiation levels for workers at nuclear power 
plants.  See 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.101-.104; see also supra part 
III.B.1. 
0See supra notes 12-13. 
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 Plaintiffs also contend that the Part 20 dose standards 
govern only during normal operating conditions, not during 
accidents.  But neither the language of the regulations nor its 
history suggests this interpretation.  Instead, we believe the 
Part 20 dose limits were intended as the maximum permitted under 
all conditions, accident and normal operations alike.  The NRC 
itself has adopted this interpretation, stating it "believes that 
the dose limits for normal operation should remain the primary 
guidelines in emergencies," 56 Fed. Reg. 23360, 23365 (1991), and 
we believe this agency interpretation is entitled to some 
deference.  See Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).  
   For many of the same reasons that we adopt §§ 20.105 
and 20.106 as the applicable standard of care, we reject the 
ALARA regulations as part of that standard.  First, we believe 
the language of the ALARA regulations compels this result. 
Section 50.34a explicitly provides: 
The guides set out in Appendix I provide 
numerical guidance on design objectives for 
light-water-cooled nuclear power reactors to 
meet the requirements that radioactive 
material in effluents released to 
unrestricted areas be kept as low as is 
reasonably achievable.  These numerical 
guides for design objectives and limiting 
conditions for operation are not to be 
construed as radiation protection standards. 
(emphasis added).  The regulation could not be more clear.  The 
guidelines that satisfy ALARA "are not to be construed as 
radiation protection standards."  Id.0  In fact, § 50.36a(b) 
                     
0We recognize some ambiguity in the regulatory history on whether 
ALARA is intended to serve as a radiation protection standard, 
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expressly permits continued operation of a nuclear plant if 
radiation releases rise above the Appendix I ALARA levels so long 
as they remain "within the limits specified in § 20.106."0 
 Second, the regulation that incorporated the Appendix I 
guidelines (that contains ALARA language) explained that the 
"radiation protection standards" of 10 C.F.R. Part 20 continued 
to protect public health:  
 It should be emphasized that the 
Appendix I guides as here adopted by the 
Commission are not radiation protection 
standards.  The numerical guides of Appendix 
I which we announce today are a quantitative 
expression of the meaning of the requirement 
that radioactive material in effluents 
released to unrestricted areas . . . be kept 
"as low as practicable." 
 
 The Commission's radiation protection 
standards, which are based on recommendations 
of the Federal Radiation Council (FRC) as 
approved by the President, are contained in 
10 CFR Part 20, "Standards for Protection 
Against Radiation," and remain unchanged by 
this Commission decision. . . .  [T]hese FRC 
standards which have been previously adopted 
give appropriate consideration to the overall 
requirements of health protection and the 
                                                                  
see, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 19439, 19440 (1975); 35 Fed. Reg. 18385, 
18386 (1970); Staff Report of the Federal Radiation Council, 
Background Material for the Development of Radiation Protection 
Standards, May 13, 1960, at 26; Staff Report of the Federal 
Radiation Council, Background Material for the Development of 
Radiation Protection Standards, Sept. 1961, at 1, but we are 
unpersuaded by these ambiguous regulatory statements. 
0In 1987, President Reagan approved an EPA memorandum that 
revised radiation protection standards for nuclear plant 
employees.  That EPA memorandum noted that "[t]he recommendation 
that Federal agencies, through their regulations, operational 
procedures and other appropriate means, maintain doses ALARA is 
not intended to express, and therefore should not be interpreted 
as expressing, a view whether the ALARA concept should constitute 
a duty of care in tort litigation."  52 Fed. Reg. 2822, 2826 
(1987). 
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beneficial use of radiation and atomic 
energy.  The Commission believes that the 
record clearly indicates that any biological 
effects that might occur at the low levels of 
these standards have such low probability of 
occurrence that they would escape detection 
by present-day methods of observation and 
measurement. 
40 Fed. Reg. 19439, 19439-40 (1975).  
 Furthermore, as we have noted, the Atomic Energy 
Commission adopted the reasoning of the Federal Radiation Council 
in promulgating the ALARA regulations.  The Federal Radiation 
Council stipulated it had intended that federal agencies would 
determine the reasonableness of radiation releases.  See Staff 
Report of the Federal Radiation Council, Background Material for 
the Development of Radiation Protection Standards, May 13, 1960, 
at 38 ("The Federal agencies should apply these Radiation 
Protection Guides with judgment and discretion, to assure that 
reasonable probability is achieved in the attainment of the 
desired goal of protecting man from the undesirable effects of 
radiation.  The Guides may be exceeded only after the Federal 
agency having jurisdiction over the matter has carefully 
considered the reason for doing so . . . ."); Staff Report of the 
Federal Radiation Council, Background Material for the 
Development of Radiation Protection Standards, Sept. 1961, at 2 
("[N]o exposure to radiation should be permitted unless . . . 
[t]he various benefits to be expected as a result of the 
exposure, as evaluated by the appropriate responsible group, must 
outweigh the potential hazard or risk . . . ."). 
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 Finally, ALARA is defined as meaning "as low as is 
reasonably achievable taking into account the state of 
technology, and the economics of improvements in relation to 
benefits to the public health and safety, and other societal and 
socioeconomic considerations, and in relation to the utilization 
of atomic energy in the public interest."  See §§ 20.1(c); 
50.34a(a).  As the district court noted, if jurors make the ALARA 
determination, then this "results, essentially, in a negligence 
standard."  In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, No. 88-1452, slip 
op. at 29 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1994).  Adopting ALARA as part of 
the standard of care would put juries in charge of deciding the 
permissible levels of radiation exposure and, more generally, the 
adequacy of safety procedures at nuclear plants -- issues that 
have explicitly been reserved to the federal government in 
general and the NRC specifically.  See Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 
U.S. at 212 ("[T]he Federal Government maintains complete control 
of the safety and 'nuclear' aspects of energy generation. . . 
.").0 
 Adoption of a standard as vague as ALARA would give no 
real guidance to operators and would allow juries to fix the 
standard case by case and plant by plant.  An operator acting in 
the utmost good faith and diligence could still find itself 
liable for failing to meet such an elusive and undeterminable 
standard.  Our holding protects the public and provides owners 
                     
0Defendants concede that the NRC may cite operators of nuclear 
plants when it believes they have not complied with ALARA.  Our 
holding does not diminish this NRC authority. 
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and operators of nuclear power plants with a definitive standard 
by which their conduct will be measured.0 
V.  Exposure Relevant to Duty or Causation? 
 The second certified question asks, "Whether a 
particular Plaintiff's level of exposure to radiation or 
radioactive effluents relates solely to causation or also to the 
duty owed by Defendants."  The district court held that, to prove 
a breach of duty, plaintiffs need not prove they were located in 
areas in which radiation exceeded permissible levels.  Instead, 
the court concluded that such evidence is relevant only to 
determine causation, i.e., whether plaintiffs' injuries were 
caused by the TMI accident.  See In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. 
II, No. 88-1452, slip op. at 30-31 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1994). 
 Defendants contend that plaintiffs must establish that 
they were located in areas exposed to radiation in excess of that 
allowed under §§ 20.105 and/or 20.106 to establish a breach of 
duty.  Like the district court, we disagree. 
A.  Regulatory Language 
                     
0As one court noted, in adopting parallel regulations applicable 
to nuclear plant workers as the standard of care: 
 
 In a highly technical field such as 
this, although a plaintiff should be provided 
a very high level [of] protection from 
excessive exposure to radiation, a defendant 
public utility should also be provided with 
some clear statement regarding how it may 
limit a worker's dose without exposing the 
worker to injury or itself to liability.   
 
O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 748 F. Supp. 672, 678 (C.D. 
Ill. 1990), aff'd, 13 F.3d 1090, 1103-05 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2711 (1994). 
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 The language of §§ 20.105 and 20.106, which regulate 
off-site radiation exposures, does not suggest that a breach 
occurs only when persons are exposed to excessive radiation. 
Instead, the regulations provide that a breach occurs whenever 
excessive radiation is released, whether or not anyone is present 
in the area exposed.  Because the relevant unit of measurement 
(the rem) defines radiation levels in terms of their effect on 
persons, see supra note 14, the regulations must define 
impermissible radiation levels in the same way.  For example, 
§20.105(b) prohibits "[r]adiation levels which, if an individual 
were continuously present in the area, could result in his 
receiving a dose in excess of two millirems in any one hour," or 
"[r]adiation levels which, if an individual were continuously 
present in the area, could result in his receiving a dose in 
excess of 100 millirems in any seven consecutive days."  As the 
language suggests, this regulation does not prohibit only those 
emissions that actually expose individuals to certain radiation 
levels.  Instead, the regulation prohibits releases that could 
result in certain radiation levels if persons were present in the 
area.  We believe the regulation would not use the conditional, 
"if," if it was meant to specify that persons must be present in 
the area exposed. 
 Similarly, the language of § 20.106 provides, "For 
purposes of this section the concentration limits in Appendix 
'B', Table II of this part shall apply at the boundary of the 
restricted area."  The regulation does not require that any 
person actually be present at the boundary line; it merely states 
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that the regulation is violated if the radiation at the boundary 
exceeds the Appendix B limits.0 
 Therefore, the regulations provide that a violation 
occurs whenever radiation exceeds the §§ 20.105 and 20.106 levels 
-- whether or not persons actually are located in the exposed 
areas.  These regulations resemble those governing other areas of 
environmental safety, where the duty is breached by the release 
of pollutants, not by any subsequent personal injury.0 
                     
0Section 20.106(d) mandates that "the concentration limits in 
Appendix 'B', Table II of this part shall apply at the boundary 
of the restricted area," except "[t]he concentration of 
radioactive material discharged through a stack, pipe or similar 
conduit may be determined with respect to the point where the 
material leaves the conduit."  Therefore, to be precise, the 
regulation is violated when radiation exceeds the § 20.106 levels 
at the boundary of the facility or, if applicable, at a conduit 
exit. 
0For example, even absent allegations of personal injury, the EPA 
may impose penalties for, inter alia, violations of statutes and 
regulations governing air pollution, see United States v. B & W 
Investment Properties, 38 F.3d 362, 364 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1998 (1995); and toxic substances, see Alm 
Corp. v. United States EPA, Region II, 974 F.2d 380, 381-82 (3d 
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1412 (1993).  Similarly, 
"the NRC is authorized to impose civil penalties on licensees 
when federal standards have been violated."  Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 257 (1984) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2282). 
These fines are available for violations of "any applicable rule, 
regulation or order related to nuclear safety," 42 U.S.C. § 2282 
(1988), not just those violations that result in personal injury. 
In fact, although defendants contend that no one was injured by 
the TMI accident, they received a $155,000 fine for violations of 
various NRC regulations and technical specifications.  See Diane 
Sponseller, The Increasing Use of Fines as an Enforcement 
Mechanism, Pub. Util. Fortnightly, May 11, 1989, at 42, 42; see 
also Letter from Victor Stello, Jr., Director, NRC Office of 
Inspection and Enforcement, to R.C. Arnold, Sr. Vice President, 
Metropolitan Edison Company (Oct. 25, 1979).  The penalty would 
have been higher -- regulators had wanted to fine defendants 
$725,000 for the violations -- but they were limited by a $25,000 
per month maximum on fines then imposed by the Atomic Energy Act. 
See id. at 3.       
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  B.  Tort Law 
 Despite the regulations, defendants argue that, under 
traditional tort law principles, whether there has been a breach 
of duty is specific to each plaintiff.  Thus, defendants contend 
that the duty element requires a showing that each individual 
plaintiff was exposed to radiation exceeding the §§ 20.105 and/or 
20.106 permissible levels. 
 Under Pennsylvania law0 and traditional tort 
principles, a negligence cause of action requires proof of four 
elements: 
1) A duty or obligation recognized by the 
law, requiring the actor to conform to a 
certain standard of conduct for the 
protection of others against 
unreasonable risks; 
 
2) A failure to conform to the standard 
required; 
 
3) A causal connection between the conduct 
and the resulting injury; and 
 
4) Actual loss or damage resulting to the 
interests of another. 
Griggs v. BIC Corp., 981 F.2d 1429, 1434 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(citations omitted); see also Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 
989 F.2d 1360, 1366 (3d Cir. 1993); Morena v. South Hills Health 
Sys., 462 A.2d 680, 684 n.5 (Pa. 1983); W. Page Keeton et al., 
                     
0As we have noted, the 1988 Amendments retroactively required the 
applicable law for "public liability actions" be "the law of the 
State in which the nuclear incident involved occurs, unless such 
law is inconsistent" with federal law.  42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) 
(1988).  Although we have held that federal law preempts state 
tort law on the standard of care, see supra part II, we find it 
useful to refer to state tort law in construing the relationship 
between the elements of duty and causation.   
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Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 
1984). 
 Whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff is a 
question of law.  Kleinknecht, 989 F.2d at 1366; see also 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328B (1965) (court determines 
whether "facts give rise to any legal duty on the part of the 
defendant" and "the standard of conduct required of the defendant 
by his legal duty").  Furthermore, the determination "whether to 
impose a duty is essentially one of policy."  Hoffman v. Sun Pipe 
Line Co., 575 A.2d 122, 125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); see also 
Keeton et al., supra, § 53, at 358 ("[I]t should be recognized 
that 'duty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an 
expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy 
which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to 
protection."). 
 In this case, the applicable regulatory agencies 
already have weighed the competing policy considerations.  As we 
have noted, the Atomic Energy Commission viewed §§ 20.105 and 
20.106 as providing a balance between public safety and 
operational practicality.  See 25 Fed. Reg. 8595 (1960). Although 
the AEC noted that its regulations provided a "conservative 
standard of safety," it said it realized that "lower exposure 
limits would be used if considered practical" and "considerably 
higher exposure limits . . . would not have been considered to 
result in excessive hazards."  Id.  Thus, the federal regulatory 
agencies have analyzed the competing policies in defining 
acceptable (and non-acceptable) conduct.  We hold that the duty 
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of care is measured by whether defendants released radiation in 
excess of the levels permitted by §§ 20.105 or 20.106, as 
measured at the boundary of the facility, not whether each 
plaintiff was exposed to those excessive radiation levels. 
 Because defendants conceded that they violated §20.106, 
they violated their duty of care, thus satisfying the first and 
second elements of a negligence action.0  See Griggs, 981 F.2d at 
1434.  Of course, plaintiffs still must prove causation and 
damages before they may recover.  Id. 
 This situation is analogous to the practice followed by 
many jurisdictions with negligence per se cases.  In such cases, 
where defendants violated the relevant statute or regulation, 
courts have held as a matter of law that plaintiffs have 
satisfied the first two elements of their cause of action: the 
duty and breach of duty.  Nevertheless, "[t]here will still 
remain open such questions as the causal relationship between the 
violation and the harm to the plaintiff . . . ."  Keeton et al., 
supra, § 36, at 230; see also 1 J.D. Lee & Barry A. Lindahl, 
                     
0We note that "the scope of the duty not to place others at risk 
is limited to those risks which are reasonably foreseeable." 
Maxwell v. Keas, 639 A.2d 1215, 1217 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); see 
also Keeton et al., § 43, at 280 (negligence "necessarily 
involves a foreseeable risk").  Thus, there may be cases in which 
plaintiffs were located far enough away from a defendant's power 
plant that any injuries from excessive radiation released at the 
boundary of the plant would be unforeseeable.  See, e.g., 
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
Nevertheless, we believe it is entirely foreseeable for nuclear 
power plant operators to expect that any excessive radiation 
releases might cause harm, even if the injured were not at the 
precise spots where the radiation exceeded federal levels, but 
instead were located in areas where radiation could spread via 
wind, rain, or water. 
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Modern Tort Law: Liability & Litigation, § 3.33, at 102 (1980) 
("Under the per se rule, the violation of an applicable statute 
is conclusive proof of negligence, leaving only the question of 
causation to be determined.") (footnote omitted).   
 But defendants contend that, if individual radiation 
exposures are not considered in determining breach of duty, they 
will be forced to stand trial on potentially thousands of 
meritless claims.  We disagree.  As part of the causation 
inquiry, each plaintiff must demonstrate exposure to radiation 
released during the TMI accident.  See In Re Paoli Railroad Yard 
PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 860 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding 
exposure to be an element of claim for injuries from hazardous 
substance), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991); In re "Agent 
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1437 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(requiring that plaintiffs "demonstrate with sufficient accuracy 
their levels of personal exposure to Agent Orange," in addition 
to "individual causation, i.e., that Agent Orange exposure caused 
the particular illnesses upon which they base their claims"), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994); A Guide to Toxic Torts 
(MB), § 10.01[2](a), at 10-5 (1995) ("In toxic tort litigation, 
however, causation is not a simple matter for the jury.  The 
plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of evidence the 
presence of the injury-causing substance, that he or she has been 
exposed to the substance, and that the exposure has resulted in 
certain injuries.").0 
                     
0See also Latimer v. SmithKline & French Labs., 919 F.2d 301, 304 
(5th Cir. 1990) (mandating evidence of "the requisite exposure" 
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 In Paoli, plaintiffs claimed they were injured by 
exposure to high levels of polychlorinated biphenyls, better 
known as PCBs.  We agreed with the district court that 
plaintiffs' prima facie case consisted of four elements: 
1) that defendants released PCBs into the 
environment; 2) that plaintiffs somehow 
ingested these PCBs into their bodies; 3) 
that plaintiffs have an injury; and 4) that 
PCBs are the cause of that injury. 
Id.; see also Hines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 262, 275 
(3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Paoli's four required elements). 
 The first element represents a combination of the 
traditional duty and breach of duty elements, as stated in 
Griggs, supra; it assumes that defendants had a duty not to 
release PCBs into the environment but did so anyway.  The 
remainder of the Paoli factors breaks up the causation and injury 
requirements into three elements, adding an "exposure" prong into 
the causation and injury inquiry.  As in Paoli, this analysis is 
useful here, where the substance that allegedly injured 
plaintiffs also occurs naturally in the environment.  This 
                                                                  
in case alleging injury from pesticide); Catrett v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting 
that plaintiff has "burden of proving by admissible evidence that 
her husband's exposure to Celotex's [asbestos-containing] 
products had proximately caused his death"), rev'd on other 
grounds, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).  Similarly, in Thompson v. Southern 
Pacific Transp. Co., 809 F.2d 1167, 1168 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 819 (1987), a railroad brakeman sued his former 
employer and a chemical company alleging that exposure to dioxin 
caused his illness.  Before trial, the chemical company admitted 
that dioxin had contaminated its plant site.  A jury found for 
plaintiff, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
overturned the award.  The court noted the plaintiff's evidence 
as to causation was insufficient because he failed to produce 
adequate evidence showing that he actually was exposed to dioxin 
and that dioxin caused his illness.  Id. at 1169. 
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"exposure" element requires that plaintiffs demonstrate they have 
been exposed "to a greater extent than anyone else," i.e., that 
their "exposure level exceeds the normal background level." 
Paoli, 916 F.2d at 860-61. 
 Translated to this case, the Paoli factors require 
plaintiffs to show that: 1) defendants released radiation into 
the environment in excess of the §§ 20.105 or 20.106 levels; 2) 
plaintiffs were exposed to this radiation (although not 
necessarily at the levels prohibited by §§ 20.105 and 20.106); 3) 
plaintiffs have injuries; and 4) radiation was the cause of those 
injuries.  Although defendants concede the first element here, 
summary judgment still may be entered on any of the remaining 
issues, just as it ordinarily might be entered on the question of 
duty or breach thereof.  See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1290 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (granting summary 
judgment to defendants because, even accepting plaintiff's claim 
that he was exposed to Agent Orange, "there is no proof that the 
diseases and symptoms suffered by him were caused by Agent 
Orange"), aff'd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988); Latimer v. SmithKline & 
French Labs., 919 F.2d 301, 304 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming 
summary judgment on causation element for defendant in case 
alleging injury from pesticide "because the evidence in the 
record does not establish the requisite exposure").  Therefore, 
contrary to defendants' assertions, our holding on the scope of 
their duty will not require them to stand trial on meritless 
claims.  
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VI.  Conclusion 
 In sum, defendants violated their standard of care if 
they released radiation exceeding the levels permitted under 
§§20.105 and 20.106 -- whether or not individual plaintiffs were 
harmed.  Once defendants exceeded the federal standards on 
radiation emission, they breached their duty.  Plaintiffs' 
exposures to radiation remain relevant, but only to prove 
causation and damages. 
   For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part and 
reverse in part. 
